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CASE COMMENTS
Court to strike it down. It should be noted that many other states,
including West Virginia,25 have similar statutes. Perhaps the major
burden should fall on legislators to re-evaluate their states' broad
criminal syndicalism legislation; but, in any case, state courts should
take notice of the Brandenburg decision, bearing in mind that a
proper interpretation of the statutes are essential if they are to sur-
vive future challenges such as the one involved in Brandenburg.
Charles Blaine Myers, Jr.
Constitutional Law - Inter-Institutional
Juvenile Transfer: Due Process and Equal Protection
Michael Edward Shone, fifteen, was committed to the Boys
Training Center by a Maine juvenile court pursuant to statutory
authority.' Thirteen days afterwards, Shone was deemed "incor-
rigible" by the administrators of the Training Center, and upon
the approval of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Cor-
rections, he was transferred to the Men's Correctional Center.2 This
W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 1, § 5 (Michie 1966):
It shall be unlawful for any person to speak, print, publish, or communi-
cate ... any teachings, doctrines or counsels in sympathy with or in favor
of ideals, institutions, or forms of government hostile ... to those now ...
existing under the Constitution and laws of this State or of the United
States, or in sympathy with or in favor of the propriety, duty, and
necessity of crime, violence or other unlawful means of terrorism, as a
means of accomplishing economic or political reform, or in sympathy
with or in favor of the overthrow of organized society, the unlawful
destruction of property or the violation of law.
1ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 2714 (Supp. 1967) provided in part that
"[a] boy between the ages of 11 and 17 may be committed to the Boys
Training Center .... All commitments of such children shall be for the term
of their minority, unless sooner discharged by the superintendent .... "
2At the time of Shone's transfer, M. Rv. STAT. ANN, tit. 34, § 801 (Supp.
1967) provided in part that:
the Men's Correctional Center . . . shall be maintained for the con-
finement and rehabilitation of: (1) Males between 16 and 17 years of
age . .. after being adjudicated by the juvenile court to have com-
mitted juvenile offenses. (2) Males over 15 years of age. Males over
15 years of age determined in accordance with Title 15, section 2717 to
be incorrigible while under commitment to the Boys Training Center....
The provisions for the safekeeping or employment of such inmates shall
be made for the purpose of teaching such inmates a useful trade or pro-
fession, and improving their mental and moral condition.
Shone v. Maine, 406 F. 2d 844, 845 n.2 (1969).
1970]
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transfer was effected in accordance with the Maine statutory pro-
cedure3 Having exhausted his state remedies, Shone petitioned the
federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he
was confined in violation of the due process and equal protection
provisions of the fourteenth amendment. On dismissal of the
petition, Shone appealed to the United States Court of Appeals.
Held, judgment vacated and the cause remanded with instruc-
tions to grant the writ of habeas corpus returning Shone to the
Boys Training Center. The transfer, based on an administrative
determination of incorrigibility without a judicial hearing, was
violative of due process and equal protection provisions. Shone v.
Maine, 406 F. 2d 844 (1st Cir. 1969).
In arriving at this decision, the Shone court relied heavily upon
four specific cases. First, the court referred to Baxstrom v. Herold,4
in which the petitioner was certified insane while a prisoner and
then transferred to a state hospital for the criminally dangerous in-
sane. At the expiration of his sentence, without having been given
notice or a hearing, Baxstrom was held over at the hospital in ac-
cordance with the decision of the Department of Mental Hygiene.5
'ME. RFv. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 2717 (1964). The provision states:
Any child committed to the center, or whose presence therein may be
seriously detrimental to the well-being of the center, or who will-
fully and persistently refuses to obey the rules and regulations of said
center may be deemed incorrigible, and upon a recommendation of the
superintendent may be transferred to a reformatory with the approval
of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Corrections, but no child
shall be transferred under the age of 15. To so transfer, the superin-
tendent shall certify that the child is incorrigible upon the mittimus
in the case with the recommendation that transfer to the appropriate
reformatory be effected.... It shall be the duty of the officers of the
reformatory to receive any person so transferred and the remainder of
the original commitment shall be executed at the reformatory, except
that in the event a child so transferred has, in the opinion of the super-
intendent of the reformatory and of the superintendent of the center,
benefited from the program at the reformatory, to such an extent that
return to the center would be in the best interest of the child and of
the community, such child may be returned to the center. The reason
for such return shall be certified by the recommending superintendents
of the mittimus and certification of the return shall be made by the
recommending superintendents to the Commissioner of Mental Health
and Corrections, giving their reasons therefor.
'383 U.S. 107 (1966).
'Under § 384 of the New York Correction Law, Baxstrom was transferred
to the jurisdiction of the Department of Mental Hygiene at the end of his
sentence. The department, however, determined ex parte that Baxstrom was not
suitable for care in a civil hospital. Therefore, when his sentence expired, he
remained in the state hospital for the dangerously insane under the custody of
the Department of Mental Hygiene.
[VCol. 72
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The United States Court of Apeals in Shone pointed out that Bax
strom stands for the proposition that it is "unconstitutionally arbit-
rary to allow state administrators to determine ex parte whether those
nearing the end of a penal sentence were too dangerous for a civil
hospital when the same issue was judicially determined for non-
prisoners."6 The fact that Baxstrom had been, in effect, administra-
tively transferred to a functionally distinct institution without
judicial determination that he was dangerously insane was the basis
for the court's inquiry in Shone of whether or not the transfer
involved there was between functionally distinct institutions.7
Secondly, the court referred to Specht v. Patterson," in which
the petitioner was convicted for indecent liberties under one
Colorado statute, but given an indefinite sentence under another
statute, the Colorado Sex Offenders Act. In Specht, the petitioner
was denied due process by the trial court's "critical new finding as
to whether he constituted a threat of bodily harm to the public, or
was an habitual offender and mentally ill, [which] had been made
without a hearing and on the basis of hearsay evidence to which he
did not have access." 9 In Specht, it was improperly assumed by the
lower court that one convicted of indecent liberties also constitutes
a threat to the public, a separate statutory offense under the Col-
orado Sex Offenders Act. The finding of this critical fact - being
'Shone v. Maine, 406 F. 2d 844, 848 (1st Cir. 1969).
TIn Shone the phase ('functionally distinct institution" encompasses both
differences in treatment and differences in privileges accorded the inmates of
each institution. For example, under the Maine Statute the Boys Center is des-
cribed as a place for rehabilitation of boys aged 11 to 17 through "education,
casework, group work, psychology, psychiatry, medicine, nursing, vocational
training, and religion related to human relations -. .. Shone v. Maine, 406
F. 2d 844, 845 N. 1 (1st Cir. 1969) citing ME. Rv. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 2714 (Supp.
1967). In contrast, the Men's Correctional Center was established for the pur-
pose of teaching such inmates a useful trade or profession, and improving
their mental and moral condition." ME. REv. STAT. AN., tit. 34, § 801 (1964).
According to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Shone v. State, 237
A. 2d 412, 416 (Ie. 196), it is
[t]rue, at the Center a juvenile is not required to wear institutional
garb; he is not under constant surveillance of guards; he is not confin-
ed within fenced or walled areas; he may leave the grounds to spend
week-ends at private homes; he may attend a public high school in the
vicinity or be allowed to take courses at the University of Maine; he
may travel throughout the state as part of the Center's athletic program
or choir group. All these liberties vanish with his transfer to the
Reformatory. But they are withdrawn for all juveniles transferred because
of incorrigibility and thus the procedure is not offensive to the
requirement of equal protection."
'386 U.S. 605. Constitutional (1967).
9Shone v. Maine, 406 F. 2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1969).
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a threat to the public - should have been the result of a distinct
judicial hearing and not a mere assumption.
By combining the "functionally distinct institution" concept
extracted from Baxstrom and the "critical new finding of fact" stan-
dard in Specht, the court in Shone announced the principle that
"substantially the same procedural protections [must] be extended
to a juvenile committed to the Training Center before he can
be lawfully transferred to a functionally distinct institution on the
basis of a critically new finding of fact."10 Whether or not Shone
was incorrigible is immaterial to the decision, but that this finding
of fact was made by state officials on an ex parte basis, when the
same classification is judicially determined for all those not in the
custody of the Boys' Training Center, is repugnant to the due pro-
cess and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
After determining that Shone's constitutional rights had been
violated by the transfer, the court turned to the question of whether
or not it might read into the Maine transfer statute the necessary
procedural protections to prevent the statute from being declared
void. In attempting this, the court referred to two cases, Bolton v.
Harris," in which the petitioner was committed to a mental institu-
tion under "radically different procedures" than those civilly com-
mitted,- and People ex rel. Goldfinger v. Johnson' 3 in which peti-
tioner was administratively transferred to "an institution for
defective delinquents" without the notice or hearing granted under
New York law to others similarly judged. In Bolton, the court
referred to Baxstrom to support its holding that one committed to
a mental hospital under criminal procedure has a right to the pro-
tective benefits accorded those civilly committed. The Shone de-
cision, of course, reaffirms this concept of having no distinctions in
commitment procedures by the state. In Goldfinger, both Baxstrom
and Specht were relied upon in protecting due process rights of the
petitioner in a factual situation paralleling the facts in Shone.14
The court in Shone relied on these cases not only as aids in inter-
"Id. at 848.
21595 F. 2d 642 (D. C. Cir. 1968).
"2Id. at 847.
'53 Misc. 2d 949, 280 N.Y.S. 2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
"Petitioner in Goldfinger was returned on parole violation to a correctional
school. Later he was "administratively transferred to an institution for defective
delinquents without receiving the notice and hearing granted under New York
law to others adjudged dangerous mental defectives." Shone v. Maine, 406 F.
2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1969).
[Vol. 72
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preting the principles established by Baxstrom and Specht, but also
because, in both, the courts read into the particular statutes the
necessary provisions to satisfy the federal constitutional require-
ments for due process and equal protection. However, the federal
court in Shone could not do this because the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine from which Shone was appealed, specifically stated
that "[the] transfer statute, 15 M.R.S.A. § 2717, as can readily be
observed, does not expressly provide either for notice and hearing
at the hands of the administrative officials nor does it intimate even
by implication any requirement of court approval."'
In summary, the Shone decision holds as follows: (a) the trans-
fer of a juvenile offender from an institution to which he has been
committed to a functionally different institution based upon an
ex parte administrative finding of critical fact (i.e., incorrigibility)
violates the due process provision of the Federal Constitution; (b)
such transfer of a juvenile offender without according him the same
procedural protections provided for all others committed to the
institution violates the equal protection provision of the Federal
Constitution; and (c) if the statute involved cannot be construed
so as to provide for, inter alia, notice and hearing, it shall be declar-
ed void.
It is interesting to examine the present West Virginia statutory
transfer procedures for juvenile offenders in light of the Shone
decision. Briefly restated, the relevant parts of chapters 25, 26 and
28 of the West Virginia Code provide as follows: (1) the Chil-
dren's Home in Elkins is a charitable institution for children com-
mitted to the home in the manner authorized by law;16 (2) boys
committed to the industrial school for boys,1 7 or girls committed to
"Shone v. Maine, 406 F. 2d 844, 849 (1st Cir. 1969) citing Shone v. State,
237 A.2d 412, 414 (ME. 1968).
11W. VA. CODE ch. 26, art. 1, § 2 (Michie 1966).
1 W. VA. CODE ch. 28, art. 1, § 2 (Michie 1966) states in part that:
Any... male youth between the ages of ten and eighteen years may be
committed to the West Virginia industrial school for boys: (a) By any
juvenile or domestic relations court of competent jurisdiction for any of
the causes, and in the manner prescribed in ariicle two, chapter forty-
nine . . . of the Code of West Virginia, one thousand nine hundred
thirty-one, as amended and reenacted by chapter one, acts of the
legislature of West Virginia, first extraordinary session, one thousand
nine hundred thirty-six, pertaining to delinquent children. (b) By any
court of record of competent jurisdiction of this State or of the United
States for the districts of West Virginia in the manner prescribed in the
next succeeding section . . . of this article: Provided, however, that
any . .. male youth who has been adjudged delinquent and placed on
1970)
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the industrial home for girls"' may be so committed only by a court of
record; (3) the State Commissioner of Public Institutions may, for
any good reason, cause the transfer of any inmate from any state in-
stitution, except the penitentiary, to any other state institution; 1 (4)
should a girl at the industrial home for girls become incorrigible
or unmanageable, she may be returned to the court which com-
mitted her, or at the discretion of the State Commissioner of Public
Institutions, she may be transferred temporarily to some other
institution, or otherwise disposed of as the Commissioner deems
best. o
An examination of these statutes also reveals that, just as in
Shone, there are many functional differences between the West Vir-
ginia institutions. While there is nearly total freedom of movement
and association for a youth at the children's home, such freedom is
strictly curtailed at the industrial schools. Both in treatment and in
privileges, the institutions are functionally distinct because the pur-
probation by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to his eighteenth
birthday may be committed to the West Virginia industrial school for
boys for any act or omission amounting to a violation of any condi-
tion of his probation which said act or omission occurred prior to the
expiration of the period of his probation and prior to the attainment
of his twenty-first birthday.
1"W. VA. CODE ch. 28, art. 3 § 2 (Michie 1966) states that:
Any... girl, a legal resident of the State between the ages of twelve and
eighteen years, may be committed to the West Virginia industrial home
for girls: (a) By any juvenile or domestic relations court of competent
jurisdiction for any of the causes and in the manner prescribed in article
two, chapter forty nine of this Code for dealing with delinquent children;
(b) By any court of record of competent jurisdiction of this State or of
the United States for the districts of West Virginia, in the manner pro-
vided in the next succeeding section of this article.
'W. VA. CODE ch. 25, art. 1, § 16 (Michie 1966) states as follows:
The State commissioner of public institutions shall have authority to
cause the transfer of any patient, or inmate, from any State institution,
except the penitentiary, to any other State institution which is better
fitted for the care or treatment of such patient or inmate, or for other
good cause or reason. (emphasis added)
'W. VA. CODE ch. 28, art. 3, § 7 (Michie 1966) which provides in part as
follows:
If,... after the admission of any girl to the industrial home. . . should
she become incorrigible or unmanageable, such girl may be returned to
the court or judge by whom she was committed to the home, or, at the
discretion of the State commissioner of public institutions, [she] may
be transferred temporarily to some other institution for care or treat-
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poses for which the institutions were established are vastly dif-
ferent.21
A second aspect of the Shone decision relevant to West Vir-
ginia statutory law has to do with the inter-institutional transfer
of juveniles based on administrative classifications. According to
the superintendents of all the West Virginia state institutions invol-
aFor example, the West Virginia Children's Home is a charitable institution
set up to care for the abandoned and neglected children in West Virginia,
until they reach majority. The children are committed either by court order
or by the Department of Public Assistance, WFsr VmnalNr BLUEBOOK 453 (52d
ed. 1968). They have nearly the same privileges that they would have if in a
private family home. They attend public schools for junior and senior high
school, and they enjoy complete freedom as to their associations in the commun-
ity. According to the superintendent, there are no security measures and every
effort is made to try to achieve an atmosphere of normal home living. (Letter
from Superintendent Betty Bambrick to Delby Barker Stobbs, September 15,
1969).
In contrast to the non-restrictive atmosphere of the West Virginia Children's
Home, the industrial schools are organized to provide a completely different
environment. Both are described as correctional institutes in the West Virginia
Code. There are facilities within them to provide a wide variety of educational
training; however, none of the inmates are permitted to attend public schools.
As outlined in the West Virginia Code, a juvenile is committed to either
industrial school by a court of record. W. VA. CoDE ch. 28, art. 3, § 2 (Michie
1966); W. VA. CODE ch. 28, art. 1, § 2 (Michie 1966). Both institutions have
an honor system through which special privileges can be earned. Both institu-
tions operate on a security system. In addition, various athletic and recreational
programs are in effect.
In contrasting the Forestry Camp to both the Children's Home and the
industrial school for boys, functional distinctions are observable. While the
Forestry Camp is not as open and unrestricted as the Children's Home, neither
is it as confining as the industrial school. The boys range from sixteen to
twenty-one and all are committed there by courts of record. W. VA. CODE ch. 25,
art. 4, § 6 (Michie 1966). The camp functions completely on an honor system
through which weekend passes may be earned. A variety of educational classes
are offered, ranging from math and reading courses to vocational training. As
in the industrial schools, however, none of the boys are allowed to attend
public schools. According to Superintendent Kenneth Rubenstein, the attitude
taken toward the youths is one of "trying to get each boy to do his own think-
ing." (Letter from Superintendent K. Rubenstein to Delby Barker Stobbs,
September 15, 1969). In a letter commenting on differences between the For-
estry Camp and the Industrial School, the Honorable George H. Whaley stated
that "the Industrial School for Boys has more security" and that if a youngster
"has conducted himself so as to be too much of a security risk [at the Forestry
Camp], he can return to the committing court." (Letter from Judge George H.
Whaley to Delby Barker Stobbs, September 23, 1969). It is immaterial for pre-
sent purposes as to which institution's approach and treatment of the youths
is most satisfactory. What is material is that they are all functionally distinct in
terms of privileges and treatment.
1970]
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ved, all transfers are now effected by a court of record.M This would
seem to bring the transfer process of West Virginia into accord with
Shone, except for the final consideration raised in the Shone
decision.
In Shone the court found it impossible to interpret the Maine
Statute involved so as to satisfy the requirement for a judicial
hearing. Although presently the transfer of juveniles among West
Virginia institutions may be done through judicial hearings in
accordance with the West Virginia Code, youths need not necessarily
be transferred through a judicial hearing either now or in the
future because the State Commissioner of Public Institutions has
the authority to effect transfers to or from any state institution ex-
cept the penitentiary.- There is no mention of judicial proceedings
either explicitly or impliedly in the statute. The commissioner has
legislative permission to exercise unlimited control over the trans-
fer procedures if he wishes. His control over the transfers is even
broader than that given to the commissioner by the Maine statute
24
which was declared unconstitutional. The Maine statute allowed
transfers of incorrigible youths only, whereas the West Virginia
2According to the Superintendent of the Forestry Camp, transfers which
occur from the camp to the industrial school are done through a court pro-
ceeding (Letter from Superintendent Rubenstein to Delby Barker Stobbs, Septem-
ber 15, 1969). Superintendent Bambrick of the West Virginia Children's
Home commented that the procedure has changed and now all transfers are
through a court of record. This statement was in reference to former transfers
which have occurred between the Children's Home and industrial school for
girls without judicial consideration. (Letter from Superintendent Bambrick
to Delby Barker Stobbs, September 15, 1969, and letter from Superintendent
Noah to Delby Barker Stobbs, September 2, 1969). The most recent of these
transfers was over two years ago. It was made from the Children's Home to the
industrial school for girls because the girl was determined to be incorrigible by
the Children's Home staff. The transfer was approved by the commissioner of
public institutions. (Letter from Superintendent Noah to Delby Barker Stobbs,
September 2, 1969).
'W. VA. CODE ch. 25 art. 1, § 16 (Michie Supp. 1969) provides in part that
"[t]he State commissioner of public institutions shall have authority to cause the
transfer of any patient, or inmate, from any State institution, except the peni-
entiary, to any other State institution which is better fitted for the care or
treatment of such patient or inmate, or for other good cause or reason."
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 2717 (Supp. 1967). The provision states
as follows:
Any child committed to the center whose presence therein may be ser-
iously detrimental to the well-being of the center, or who will-
fully and persistently refuses to obey the rules and regulations of said
center may be deemed incorrigible, and upon recommendation of the
superintendent may be transferred to a reformatory with the approval
of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Corrections, but no child
[Vol. 72
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statute simply includes "any inmate." It may be concluded that al-
though the actual procedure recently implemented to transfer a
youth in West Virginia is in accord with Shone, the statutory pro-
cedure as outlined in West Virginia Code, chapter 25, article 1,
section 16 may be violative of Shone as it does not explicitly or
impliedly make a judicial hearing part of the transfer process.
Ironically, not only is West Virginia Code chapter 25, article 1,
section 16 potentially subject to the same fate as the Maine statutes
in Shone, but it also contradicts other provisions of the West Vir-
ginia Code which provide that any commitment to the forestry
school or industrial school must be made by a court.V Thus, a juve-
nile transfer by the commissioner either to or from the state juvenile
institutions without a judicial hearing may be in violation of both
the Federal Constitution and a coordinate provision of the West
Virginia Code.
Another statutory provision which may run afoul of the Shone
decision is West Virginia Code chapter 28, article 3, section 7, which
explains transfer procedures for an incorrigible girl.26 It basically
shall be transferred under the age of 15. To so transfer, the superin-
tendent shall certify that the child is incorrigible upon the mittimus
in the case with the recommendation that transfer to the appropriate
reformatory be effected. Upon approval by the Commissioner of Men-
tal Health and Corrections, the transfer may be effected any time
thereafter. It shall be the duty of the officers of the reformatory to
receive any person so transferred and the remainder of the original
commitment shall be executed at the reformatory, except that in the
event a child so transferred has, in the opinion of the superintendent of
the reformatory and of the superintendent of the center, benefited
from the program at the reformatory, to such an extent that return to
the center would be in the best interest of the child and of the
community, such child may be returned to the center. The reason for
such return shall be certified by the recommending superintendents on
the mittimus and certification of the return shall be made by the
recommending superintendents to the Commissioner of Mental Health
and Corrections, giving their reasons therefor.
'See notes 17 and 18 supra for relevant portions W. VA. CODE ch. 28, art.
1, § 2 and ch. 28, art. 3, § 2 (Michie 1966). W. VA. CODE ch. 25, art. 4,
§ 6 (Michie Supp. 1969) reads in part as follows:
The judge of any court with original criminal jurisdiction, or any
juvenile court, may suspend the imposition of sentence of any male
youth convicted of or pleading guilty to a criminal offense, other than a
capital offense, who has attained his sixteenth birthday but has not
reached his twenty-first birthday at the time of the commission of the
crime, and commit him to the custody of the West Virginia commission-
er of public institutions to be assigned to a forestry camp.... If, in the
opinion of the superintendent, such male offender proves to be an unfit
person to remain in such a camp, he shall be returned to the court
which committed him to be dealt further with according to law.
"See W. VA. CODE, Supra note 20.
1970]
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states that an incorrigible girl may be returned to the committing
court; or at the discretion of the Commissioner of Public Institu-
tions, she may be transferred to another institution or otherwise
disposed of. This statute is also much broader than the compara-
tive Maine statute because of the discretionary power which the
commissioner has.2 7 The Maine statute gives the commissioner a
choice of either transferring or not transferring. The West Virginia
statute gives the commissioner the choice of (1) sending the girl
back to court, (2) transferring the girl, or (3) otherwise disposing
of the girl. This statutory provision and West Virginia Code chapter
25, article 1, section 16, both separately and combined, give the
Commissioner of Public Institutions the power to effect transfers on
an ex parte basis. By leaving the ultimate determination to the
Commissioner's discretion, the provision permits action which,
in light of Shone, presumably is violative of the Federal Constitu-
tion. It is questionable whether the West Virginia court would read
the requirement of a judicial hearing into the present West Virginia
statutests because, as in the Maine statute, there is no suggestion
that a court's approval is necessary to the transfer.
Delby Barker Stobbs
Constitutional Law - Lance v. Board of Education -
Constitutionality of Extraordinary Majority Elections
The plaintiffs were taxpayers, citizens, and registered voters
residing in Roane County, West Virginia, who had participated in
a special election submitted by the Board of Education to the
county voters for approval of a bond issue and an additional five-
year tax levy." The vote canvass indicated that the bond issue was
See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. Supra note 3.
'Recently there have been some attempts by the West Virginia Legislature
to modernize concepts in chapters 25, 26 and 28 of the West Virginia Code. Of
particular relevance was S.B. 292 which died in the House, May 19, 1969. S.B.
292, W. Va. Leg. Reg. Sess. 1969. The bill involved repealing chapters 25 and
28 of the West Virginia Code, abolishing the Department of Public Institutions
and the commissioner, and creating a Department of Correction with a new
commissioner. Unfortunately, the new provisions would have given the new
commissioner the same transfer powers as the present Commissioner of Public
Institutions now has.
'The bond revenue was to provide for improvement of existing facilities in
the way of classroom construction, and for the removal of fire hazards. The levy
revenue was allocated partially to current expenditures as well as to improve-
ments. Lance v. Board of Educ. 170 S.E. 2d 788, 785 (W. Va. 1969).
[Vol. 72
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